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INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE 
Amici are Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, House Democratic Leader 
Nancy Pelosi, and the following congressional leaders and leaders of the relevant 
committees of jurisdiction:   
Sen. Dick Durbin  
(Assistant Majority Leader) 
 
Rep. Steny H. Hoyer  
(House Democratic Whip) 
Sen. Charles Schumer  
(Conference Vice Chair) 
 
Rep. James E. Clyburn  
(Democratic Assistant Leader) 
Sen. Patty Murray  
(Conference Secretary) 
 
Rep. John B. Larson  
(Chair of Democratic Caucus) 
Sen. Max Baucus  
(Chair, Committee on Finance) 
 
Rep. Xavier Becerra  
(Vice Chair of Democratic Caucus) 
Sen. Tom Harkin  
(Chair, Committee on Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions) 
Rep. John D. Dingell  
(Sponsor of House Health Care 
reform legislation) 
 
Sen. Patrick Leahy  
(Chair, Committee on the Judiciary) 
Rep. Henry A. Waxman  
(Ranking Member, Committee on 
Energy and Commerce) 
 
Sen. Barbara Mikulski 
(Chair, HELP Subcommittee on 
Retirement and Aging) 
Rep. Frank Pallone, Jr.  
(Ranking Member, Commerce 
Subcommittee on Health) 
 
Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV 
(Chair, Committee on Commerce) 
 
Rep. Sander M. Levin  
(Ranking Member, Committee on 
Ways and Means) 
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Rep. Fortney Pete Stark  
(Ranking Member, Ways and Means 
Subcommittee on Health) 
 
Rep. George Miller  
(Ranking Member, Education and the 
Workforce Committee) 
 
Rep. Robert E. Andrews  
(Ranking Member, Education and 
Workforce Subcommittee on Health) 
Rep. John Conyers, Jr.  
(Ranking Member, Committee on the 
Judiciary) 
 
Rep. Jerrold Nadler  
(Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 
Constitution) 
 
  
Amici file this brief for two reasons.1  First, as elected Members of Congress, 
amici have a duty to support the Constitution, and in exercise of that duty they write 
to defend the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.  
The Act, closely debated in Congress and around the country for well over a year, is 
a landmark accomplishment of the national Legislature, which brings to fruition a 
decades-long effort to guarantee comprehensive, affordable, and secure health care 
insurance for all Americans.  Amici paid careful attention to Supreme Court 
precedents defining the proper bounds of Congress’s constitutional authority, and 
relied upon these established rules, in formulating, debating, and voting on the Act.  
They wish to put before the Court their views on why the Act is a valid exercise of 
Congress’s Article I powers. 
                                                          
 1 Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a), amici state that all parties consent to the 
filing of this brief. 
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Second, amici believe that Appellants’ legal theories, if embraced by the 
courts, would seriously undermine Congress’s constitutional authority and its 
practical ability to address pressing national problems.  Congress regularly relies on 
its enumerated powers to protect American consumers and workers, keep families 
safe, and ensure civil rights.  Amici take seriously their oath to “support and defend 
the Constitution of the United States,” and write in their constitutional role as 
Members of a coequal branch of government.  
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The central and dispositive fact in this case is that the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (“the Act” or “ACA”), including the provision that individuals 
maintain minimum health insurance coverage, is a congressional regulation of the 
interstate health insurance market.  The effective regulation of health insurance, 
moreover, is critical to the effective functioning of the enormously important 
national health care market.  The assertion that Congress lacks the legislative 
authority to regulate these national, commercial markets is an astonishing 
proposition.  Its acceptance would mean that the Commerce Clause falls short of 
authorizing the full and effective regulation of interstate commerce.  That novel 
claim is inconsistent with the Constitution and contrary to longstanding Supreme 
Court precedent.  
Case: 10-2388   Document: 006110850541   Filed: 01/21/2011   Page: 9
  4  
 
As members of Congress, we are mindful of the Supreme Court’s concern, 
stated in cases such as United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), that Congress not use the commerce power 
to regulate matters that are local and non-economic.  Those cases involved the 
attempt to regulate local crime (guns near schools and violence against women) 
because of a presumed ultimate effect on interstate commerce.  The minimum 
coverage requirement (“MCR”), in contrast, is itself a regulation of an interstate 
commercial matter– health insurance.  The effective functioning of that major 
commercial activity is critical to the national health care market in which virtually 
every American participates.  As the Supreme Court said in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 
U.S. 1, 16 (2005), “where [the act under review] is a statute that directly regulates 
economic, commercial activity, our opinion in Morrison casts no doubt on its 
constitutionality.” 
The MCR is part of a comprehensive regulatory plan designed to ensure that 
affordable coverage is widely available as a means of paying for the health care that 
virtually every American will use.  The penalty provision encourages individuals 
who lack adequate health insurance to obtain coverage that meets minimum 
standards.  Congress determined after exhaustive hearings that without this financial 
incentive for individuals to maintain adequate coverage, it would not be financially 
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practicable to prohibit insurance companies from denying coverage to those with 
pre-existing conditions or otherwise to regulate effectively the national markets in 
health insurance and health care.  
Appellants, however, urge this court to carve out an unprecedented exception 
to Congress’s plenary authority to regulate interstate commerce.  They contend that 
even matters vital to the national economy may not be regulated if they fall within an 
artificial category that Appellants call “inactivity.”  This is descriptively inaccurate, 
because (1) the penalty for failing to maintain minimum coverage applies only to 
those who participate in the economy by earning sufficient taxable income that they 
are otherwise required to file federal income tax returns and (2) virtually everyone 
subject to the penalty participates in some way in the health care market in any given 
year.  Moreover, the Supreme Court long ago rejected using arbitrary 
characterizations to constrain Congress’s power to regulate the national economy.   
See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556.   
There is nothing unprecedented about Congress imposing requirements on 
citizens who would prefer to be left alone, when those regulations are necessary to 
accomplish an objective wholly within the powers assigned to Congress.  Nor is 
there anything so surprising or severe about the provision in question that would 
suggest that it crosses some constitutional boundary and must thus be judicially 
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excised.  The provision is no more intrusive than Social Security or Medicare.  The 
Social Security Act requires individuals to make payments to provide for their 
retirement.  Medicare requires individuals to make payments to provide for their 
health coverage after they are 65 years of age or if they meet other criteria.  The 
ACA requires individuals to obtain health coverage before they are 65.  Under 
Medicare, there is one predominant payer, the government, and individuals choose 
between privately insured plans or a government-administered plan that relies on 
private providers.  Under the ACA, individuals are given an option to choose among 
insurers in the private market.  Neither Social Security nor Medicare nor the ACA is 
such a novel intrusion into liberty that judges would be justified in overriding the 
considered judgment of the elected branches that adopted those laws.   
This case tests no limits and approaches no slippery slope.  Notwithstanding 
Appellants’ improbable hypotheticals, Congress never has required Americans to 
exercise or eat certain foods – and in our view it never would.  Were Congress ever 
to consider laws of that kind infringing on personal autonomy, the judiciary would 
have ample tools under the liberty clause of the Fifth Amendment to identify and 
enforce constitutional limits.  See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 
261 (1990).  What the ACA regulates is not personal autonomy, but commercial 
transactions.   
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Suggestions that sustaining the MCR would mean that Congress could 
mandate the purchase of cars or comparable items are also disingenuous.  The 
provision requiring minimum health insurance cannot be viewed in isolation.  In this 
case, Congress has regulated insurance that provides a means of paying for health 
care services, a unique market.  As the court below noted, “[P]laintiffs in this case 
are participants in the health care services market,” and they “have made a choice 
regarding the method of payment for the services they expect to receive.”  
Health care is practically a unique product that no one can be certain he or she 
will never utilize, and whose cost is transferred to other Americans when no 
provision has been made for it.  The MCR regulates participation in this singular 
market, which plays a central role in the nation’s commerce.  And were there any 
doubt that the MCR is a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power, the 
Necessary and Proper Clause provides a reinforcing and independent basis for the 
provision’s constitutionality.  The minimum coverage provision is a valid means to 
the full and effective exercise of Congress’s regulation of interstate commerce in the 
larger Act. 
Appellants’ disagreement with the manner Congress has chosen to regulate 
two related and important national markets is an occasion for political debate, not a 
matter for judicial imposition.  Amici stand by the wisdom of the Act, which expands 
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quality, affordable insurance to millions of Americans while limiting costs and 
reducing the deficit.  But, as Justice Benjamin Cardozo wrote for the United States 
Supreme Court nearly 75 years ago:  
Whether wisdom or unwisdom resides in the scheme of [the statute in 
question], it is not for us to say. The answer to such inquiries must come from 
Congress, not the courts. Our concern here, as often, is with power, not with 
wisdom. 
 
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the 
Social Security Act of 1935). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, 
INCLUDING ITS MINIMUM COVERAGE REQUIREMENT, IS A 
VALID EXERCISE OF CONGRESS’S ENUMERATED 
CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO REGULATE COMMERCE 
AMONG THE SEVERAL STATES. 
A. Congress Has Plenary Authority To Regulate Interstate Markets, 
Including Matters Affecting The Prices Of Commodities Traded 
In Interstate Commerce. 
 The Constitution provides that “Congress shall have Power … To regulate 
Commerce … among the several States.”  Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  In decisions reaching 
back to the early years of the Republic, the Supreme Court has recognized that this 
crucial provision grants Congress plenary power to regulate the nation’s commercial 
affairs.  For, as the Supreme Court recently observed, “The Commerce Clause 
emerged as the Framers’ response to the central problem giving rise to the 
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Constitution itself: the absence of any federal commerce power under the Articles of 
Confederation.”  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16 (2005).  
Almost two hundred years ago, the Supreme Court stated that Congress’s 
regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause “is plenary as to [its] objects” and 
“co-extensive with the subject itself.”  Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 
(1824); see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984) (“At least since 
1824 Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause has been held plenary”).   
Numerous decisions since establish that when Congress regulates an interstate 
market it acts within the core of the Commerce Clause – and that “the power to 
regulate commerce … extends” not just to the literal commercial transactions of the 
relevant market but also to behavior or acts “which interfere with, obstruct, or 
prevent the due exercise of the power to regulate commerce” in that market.  United 
States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72, 78 (1838); see also Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 
189-90.  Thus, “Congress, of course, can do anything which, in the exercise by itself 
of a fair discretion, may be deemed appropriate to save the act of interstate 
commerce from prevention or interruption, or to make that act more secure, more 
reliable, or more efficient.”  Second Employers’ Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 48 (1912).  
Congress’s commerce power is “complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost 
extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the 
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constitution.”  Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196 (quoted in Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining Ass’n, 
452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981)).      
 It has long been settled, therefore, that “Congress plainly has power to 
regulate the price” of products “distributed through the medium of interstate 
commerce [and] possesses every power needed to make that regulation effective.”  
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 118-19 (1942).  In doing so, 
Congress may decide “to give protection to sellers or purchasers or both.” Currin v. 
Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 11 (1939).  “It is of the essence of the plenary power conferred 
that Congress may exercise its discretion in the use of the power….  Congress may 
consider and weigh relative situations and needs.”  Id. at 14. 
 The Court’s modern cases reaffirm that the commerce power authorizes the 
regulation of any matter that “affects the price structure and federal regulation of” an 
interstate market.  Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151 (1971).  In Perez, the 
Supreme Court summarized “three categories of problems” that Congress may 
address through its commerce powers: matters involving “the channels of interstate 
commerce ... the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in 
interstate commerce ... [and] activities affecting commerce.”  402 U.S. at 150; see 
also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.     
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 In two recent cases, Lopez and Morrison, the Court held that Congress cannot 
use an attenuated connection to interstate commerce to enact laws governing purely 
local, non-commercial matters.  Those cases involved provisions governing criminal 
behavior – possessing guns near a school and gender-motivated violence – with no 
immediate connection to any interstate market.  The Court cautioned against 
reasoning that would permit congressional regulation of matters unrelated to the 
national economy by “pil[ing] inference upon inference in a manner that would bid 
fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general 
police power of the sort retained by the States.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.  In order to 
maintain the constitutional principle that Congress is a legislature of limited and 
enumerated powers, Lopez and Morrison identified a limiting principle to the 
instrumental use of the commerce power to regulate non-commercial matters: the 
gap between some local, non-economic matter that Congress wishes to regulate and 
interstate commerce cannot be bridged by pointing to a remote causal relationship.  
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18.   
The Court has made clear that the limitation applied in Lopez and Morrison 
does not detract from Congress’s plenary authority to regulate interstate commerce 
itself.  In Raich, the Court reaffirmed that where “the [act under review] is a statute 
that directly regulates economic, commercial activity, our opinion in Morrison casts 
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no doubt on its constitutionality.”  545 U.S. at 26.  Indeed, the “case law firmly 
establishes Congress’ power to regulate purely local activities” as part of interstate 
commerce regulation.  Id. at 17; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (confirming 
Congress’s unquestioned regulatory authority “where a general regulatory statute 
bears a substantial relation to commerce” (emphasis omitted)).  As Justice Kennedy 
explained, “Congress can regulate in the commercial sphere on the assumption that 
we have a single market and a unified purpose to build a stable national economy.”  
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring).     
B. The Act, Of Which The Minimum Coverage Requirement Is An 
Integral Part, Is A Constitutional Regulation Of Interstate 
Commerce. 
1. The Commerce Clause authorizes the minimum coverage 
requirement as congressional regulation of the national 
health insurance market.   
 The Supreme Court recognized long ago that the Commerce Clause 
authorizes Congress to regulate “the business of insurance”:  “[t]hat power, … is 
vested in the Congress, available to be exercised for the national welfare as Congress 
shall deem necessary.”  United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. 533, 
552-53 (1944).   
 In the Act, Congress set forth findings about the central role of health 
insurance in the U.S. economy.  In 2009, the U.S. spent more than 17% of its gross 
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domestic product on health care.  ACA § 10106(a).  Despite that expense, some 45 
million Americans lacked health insurance for at least part of the year before 
enactment of the ACA.  One reason so many Americans lacked health insurance is 
that prior to the ACA, insurers designed practices to exclude those most in need of 
medical care, often by avoiding coverage of people with pre-existing conditions.  
Given that as many as 129 million Americans under 65 have some pre-existing 
condition, Dept. of Health & Human Svcs., At Risk: Pre-Existing Conditions Could 
Affect 1 in 2 Americans (2011), http://www.healthcare.gov/center/reports/ 
preexisting.html, these practices placed numerous families at risk for loss of health 
insurance.     
Uninsured Americans are not immune from injury, sickness, and the need for 
medical services.  According to recent reports, 94% of the long-term uninsured have 
received some medical care.  June E. O’Neill & Dave M. O’Neill, Who Are the 
Uninsured? An Analysis of America’s Uninsured Population, Their Characteristics, 
and their Health 20-22 (2009).  When Americans lack health insurance, they often 
resort to treatment in emergency rooms: according to one study, in 2007, 62.6% of 
the uninsured at a given point in time had made at least one visit to a doctor or 
emergency room within the year.  Center for Health Statistics, Health, United States, 
2009, at 318. 
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America is a charitable and caring nation, and the uninsured are, in many 
instances, provided basic health care with the cost passed on to other participants in 
the market.  A federal statute requires as much.  See, e.g., Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.  The cost of medical care for the 
uninsured is shifted through the interstate market.  In 2008, such cost-shifting 
amounted to $43 billion, see Congressional Budget Office, Key Issues in Analyzing 
Major Health Insurance Proposals 114 (Dec. 2008), creating a hidden burden 
passed along to other market participants through increased fees and premiums and 
to taxpayers through burdens on the public fisc.  Congress, in passing the Act, 
understood that barriers to full coverage in the health insurance market have 
substantial economic effects extending beyond the health care sector.  See, e.g., 
ACA § 10106 (medical expenses contribute to 62% of personal bankruptcies). 
The Act regulates the health insurance market to protect the American people 
by barring insurers from refusing or rescinding coverage based on pre-existing 
conditions, establishing new insurance markets, and promoting access to affordable 
insurance.  It also requires individuals, with certain specified exceptions, to maintain 
minimum levels of health care coverage or (in some cases) pay a tax penalty.  The 
Act as a whole is thus a core exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power to 
regulate the interstate health insurance industry. 
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 The challenged component of the Act, the MCR, fits within Congress’s 
enumerated Commerce Clause authority because (1) on its own it regulates this 
interstate market, and (2) it is an integral part of Congress’s broader regulatory 
scheme of assuring affordable health care insurance coverage for all Americans.   
First, the MCR directly addresses the affordability of health insurance and 
therefore (in light of the basic principle that insurance rests on the pooling of risks) 
its availability in the private market.  As Congress explained, the MCR “regulates 
activity that is commercial and economic in nature: economic and financial 
decisions about how and when health care is paid for, and when health insurance is 
purchased.”  ACA § 1501(a)(2)(A).  Congress acted for the purposes of “giv[ing] 
protection to sellers [and] purchasers” and stabilizing “the price structure” of the 
health care insurance market – regulatory purposes the Supreme Court has long 
recognized as within the core of the commerce power.  See Currin, 306 U.S. at 11; 
Perez, 402 U.S. at 151.  As with the law in Raich, the MCR regulates commerce by 
addressing “supply and demand in the national market” for health insurance.  See 
Raich, 545 U.S. at 19.   
As a matter of economic fact, whether an individual purchases health 
insurance, self-insures, or ignores the issue altogether is one element in the mass of 
decisions (and failures to decide) that determine the cost, and thus availability, of 
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health insurance in the market.  It is “economic” in a common-language or business 
sense: health insurance, unlike carrying guns near schools, is a product which people 
buy and sell.  The Court employs a “practical conception of commercial regulation.” 
Raich, 545 U.S. at 25 n.35 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)).  It is “well established” that the commerce power “includes the power 
to regulate the prices at which commodities in that commerce are dealt in.”  Wickard 
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942).  The failure to obtain health insurance affects 
the cost of health insurance for others and, in the future, for oneself. 
 Second, in the Act, Congress expressly found that the MCR “is an essential 
part of this larger regulation of economic activity,” the absence of which “would 
undercut Federal regulation of the health insurance market.”  ACA § 10106.  
Congress found that the MCR is “essential” for a simple reason: otherwise, the new 
regulations would encourage individuals to delay or forgo insurance, knowing that 
they could not be excluded later for pre-existing conditions.  That would cause 
higher insurance prices and greater cost-shifting.  The MCR, however, will 
“significantly reduce[] the uninsured” and “together with the [Act’s] other 
provisions … lower health insurance premiums.”  Id.  
When Congress creates a “comprehensive regulatory regime,” it may regulate 
a particular matter if the “failure to regulate ... would leave a gaping hole in the” 
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statutory regime.  Raich, 545 U.S. at 22.  Without the MCR, the objective of the 
Act’s regulation of interstate commerce would be far more difficult, if not 
impossible, to attain.  “Leaving [individuals who do not purchase health care 
insurance although financially able to do so] outside the regulatory scheme would 
have a substantial influence on price and market conditions,” id. at 19, and so 
undermine Congress’s objectives.   The Court thus explained in Raich that, “[a]s we 
have done many times before, we refuse to excise individual components of th[e] 
larger scheme.”  Id. at 22.  The same rule holds here. 
Viewed through the lens of recent cases, the Act and its MCR exercise the 
core of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.  The Act regulates the channels of 
interstate commerce, which permit the existence of insurance markets.  It also 
regulates “things in interstate commerce” – insurance contracts and transactions.  
See South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 550 (insurance “involve[s] the 
transmission of great quantities of money, documents, and communications across 
dozens of state lines”).  Finally, health insurance makes up a significant interstate 
market itself and provides a means of payment for participants in the unique national 
health care market, and so the MCR “substantially affect[s] interstate commerce.”2 
                                                          
2 The Commerce Clause also authorizes enforcement of the MCR by the 
imposition of a financial penalty for failure to comply.  Courts have long upheld 
congressional decisions to use such penalties to implement its commerce power.  See, 
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2. The minimum coverage requirement is fully consistent with 
limits on the Commerce Clause described in recent Supreme 
Court decisions   
The MCR, as a regulation of an economic market, also complies with the 
limits on Congress’s authority articulated in Lopez and Morrison.  The Act regulates 
interstate commerce, not in order to reach some further, non-commercial behavior 
but precisely in order to regulate a commercial market to achieve national purposes.  
There is thus no gap between the regulation and interstate commerce.  As the 
Supreme Court concluded in Raich, where Congress’s express purpose is to regulate 
an interstate market, the limiting principle of Lopez and Morrison is irrelevant.  See 
Raich, 545 U.S. at 26.  We are sensitive to the Court’s concern that Congress not 
overstep its authority by using its national powers to regulate truly local matters and 
its commercial authority to regulate non-economic matters that do not sufficiently 
affect commerce.  But that is simply not this case.  No chain of inferences is 
necessary to relate the MCR to the regulation of interstate commerce; instead, 
Congress is regulating a national market – the very subject matter and purpose of the 
Commerce Clause. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
e.g., Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 
315 U.S. 148 (1942); Minor v. United States, 396 U.S. 87, 98 n.13 (1969).   
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The relevant limitation to the MCR is that expressed by the terms of the 
Commerce Clause itself, and the MCR’s constitutionality rests on the fact that what 
it regulates is interstate commerce.  See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 
408, 423 (1946) (“The only limitation [the Clause] places upon Congress’ power is 
in respect to what constitutes commerce, including whatever rightly may be found to 
affect it sufficiently to make Congressional regulation necessary or appropriate”).  
Upholding a regulation of commerce itself poses no danger of transforming the 
Commerce Clause into a federal police power.   
C. There Is No Constitutional Basis For Carving Out A Novel 
Exception To Congress’s Recognized Power To Regulate 
Interstate Commerce.  
1. Whether the minimum coverage requirement should be 
categorized as activity or inactivity is an artificial distinction 
irrelevant to the question of the Act’s constitutionality. 
 Appellants repeatedly proclaim a constitutional rule limiting the Commerce 
Clause to regulations affecting economic “activities.”  Appellants have 
manufactured this supposed “rule” out of whole cloth.  Their claim is simply 
wordplay with the terminology found in some judicial opinions, none of which 
concern a difference between action and inaction.  Appellants’ claim rests on the 
happenstance that some opinions have used that language.3  Neither in those 
                                                          
3 The Court uses other terms elsewhere.  See, e.g., Olsen, 262 U.S. at 37  
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opinions nor in any other modern case has the Supreme Court suggested the 
existence of any per se limitation on the commerce power based on such conceptual 
categories. “[S]uch formulas are not provided by the great concepts of the 
Constitution.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 573 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  It is implausible that without saying so, and contrary to its 
long-standing acknowledgment that the commerce power is plenary, the Court’s 
choice of wording established a new category of matters related to commerce but 
beyond congressional regulation because someone might not label them an 
“activity.”  See Raich, 545 U.S. at 22.  
 Moreover, the Court long ago concluded that “artificial” categories and 
“abstract distinction[s]” provide no proper basis for constraining the scope of the 
commerce power.  See Lopez, 514 U. S. at 556 (pre-1937 distinction between 
“direct” and indirect” effects abandoned because it “artificially had constrained the 
authority of Congress to regulate interstate commerce”); id. at 572-73 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (approving Court’s rejection of “the abandoned abstract distinction 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(commerce power authorizes regulation of “‘[w]hatever amounts to more or less 
constant practice and threatens to obstruct or unduly to burden’” interstate 
commerce) (quoting with approval Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 521 (1922)).  
Appellants’ theory is as futile as it would be to argue that the Court’s use in Olsen 
and Stafford of the word “practice” created a constitutional limitation to “practices” 
as opposed to “non-practices.” 
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between direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce”).  Appellants’ argument 
is a novel version of the same discarded mistake.   
2. Appellants’ proposed distinction between activity and 
inactivity rests on a discredited substantive due process 
theory of economic liberty that is not cognizable in a legal 
action challenging a federal statute on Article I grounds.  
Appellants’ core claim is that by imposing an obligation on certain Americans 
to participate in a market at a particular time, the Act invades their economic “liberty 
interests.”  App. Br. at 4.  There is nothing novel about an argument that legislation 
regulating economic liberty violates the Constitution:  such arguments sound in what 
we now call economic substantive due process, and associate with the famous 
decision in Lochner v. United States, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  Appellants mention 
neither Lochner nor economic substantive due process, and for good reason: the 
Supreme Court rejected the doctrine many decades ago.  “The doctrine that 
prevailed in Lochner … has long since been discarded.  We have returned to the 
original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and 
economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies.”  Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 
U.S. 726, 730 (1963).  Cast as a challenge to Congress’s Article I powers, 
Appellants’ theory fails even to state a cognizable legal claim.  The substantive 
powers enumerated in Article I authorize Congress to impose obligations and duties 
on individuals.  In the absence of a violation of one of the Constitution’s prohibitions 
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on legislative power, Appellants’ claims are political arguments that can only 
receive a political remedy. 
 In any event, the claim that there is anything novel about the MCR because it 
obligates citizens to take action or denies them the “right” to be left alone is wrong.  
Every time the federal government requires someone to move in order to build an 
interstate highway, Congress is exercising the commerce power to require action by 
individuals who might prefer inactivity to compensation for the taking.  Congress 
has put obligations on individuals at least since the Militia Act of 1792.  In Wickard 
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942), the Court upheld Commerce Clause legislation 
despite the objection that the law “forc[ed] some farmers into the market to buy what 
they could provide for themselves.”  In parallel fashion, the MCR forces some 
taxpayers who already participate in the health care market “into the market” to 
purchase health insurance despite claims they “could provide [it] for themselves” by 
self-insurance.  Neither in Wickard nor in the present case do these observations 
even suggest a constitutional infirmity. 
As these examples demonstrate, there is nothing unconstitutional or unusual 
about legislation that requires individuals to bear some obligation to achieve a 
broader public goal.  In the present case, moreover, the MCR is simply “a 
coordination mechanism to ensure that everyone participates in a well-functioning 
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private insurance market.  By discouraging any one of us from free-riding, the 
mandate allows each of us greater protection and more affordable coverage,” – just 
like Social Security and Medicare.  See Rahul Rajkumar & Harold Pollack, An 
Essential Mandate, L.A. Times (Jan. 7, 2011).  The Constitution presupposes the 
legitimacy of legislative authority when exercised within its express limitations.  
“There is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to contract as one chooses ... the 
Constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable liberty.”  W. Coast 
Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392 (1937) (quotation omitted).  When, as here, 
Congress executes its enumerated powers, “the United States possesses the power ... 
to regulate the conduct of the citizen [and thus] abridge his liberty or affect his 
property.”  Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 524-25 (1934). 
We agree with Appellants’ insistence that the Constitution is dedicated to the 
principles of freedom.  Nonetheless, it is unclear what Appellants think so severe 
about the Act as to be an unconstitutional interference with liberty.  The 
constitutional validity of Medicare is beyond question, yet Medicare requires 
individual taxpayers to pay for health insurance they will need in old age.  The 
difference is that the MCR allows individual taxpayers to choose to purchase 
insurance in the market or pay a penalty, while under Medicare taxpayers must pay 
into the program.  The MCR is thus arguably a less intrusive approach to achieving 
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Congress’s legislative purpose than Medicare, and therefore cannot be an 
unconstitutional deprivation of liberty.  See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 
59-60 (2006) (holding that where Congress could directly impose a requirement it 
cannot be unconstitutional for Congress to permit private choices and impose 
financial consequences).  Moreover, the MCR does not require that people receive 
particular medical care and, in fact, explicitly exempts those with a religious 
objection to modern medicine.  ACA § 10106(b)(1).     
Liberty, as the Constitution presupposes and protects it, is “liberty in a social 
organization which requires the protection of law against the evils which menace the 
health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people.”  W. Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 391.  
The Commerce Clause empowers Congress to enact legislation that places 
obligations on individuals and imposes penalties for violating those obligations.  
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 401 (1940).  Liberty under 
our Constitution is liberty in a system authorizing the exercise of the governmental 
authority the Constitution delegates to Congress.  If they disagree with elements of 
the Act, Appellants may address them in the proper, democratic forum. 
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3. Upholding the Act and the minimum coverage requirement 
would not render Congress’s Commerce Clause authority 
without limits. 
 Appellants attempt to bolster their disguised Lochner claim by a slippery 
slope argument that if the MCR is valid, “the federal government will have the 
absolute and unfettered power to create complex regulatory schemes” directing 
matters “such as eating certain foods, taking vitamins, losing weight, joining health 
clubs, [or] buying a GMC truck.”  App. Br. at 32.  Consideration of the grave 
question of whether this Court must invalidate a landmark act of Congress is not 
advanced by posing an absurd parade of hypotheticals.  In any event, it is erroneous 
to suggest that there is no principled stopping point between recognizing the validity 
of a mandate related to an interstate market, and imagined laws that would impinge 
on an individual’s bodily autonomy.  The Supreme Court long ago recognized a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest in decisions about an individual’s bodily 
integrity.  See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-79.  In the 
unlikely event a Congress someday attempted to invade such a personal liberty as 
the interest in refusing to eat a certain food, a significant constitutional issue would 
be posed. 
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 The judiciary possesses authority and doctrinal tools to address laws that 
interfere oppressively with an individual’s physical integrity.  It is quite unnecessary 
to return to Lochner or deny Congress the authority to regulate an interstate market 
in order to prevent an Orwellian state.  There is a familiar and principled distinction 
between personal freedoms that the courts protect by searching analysis of 
legislation restricting them, and “‘liberties which derive merely from shifting 
economic arrangements.’”  Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 605, 651 (1972) (quoting 
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).  Freedoms 
related to the individual’s physical integrity come to the courts “‘with a momentum 
for respect lacking when appeal is made to’” economic liberty.  Id.  
Even if this Court believes that principles of economic liberty might in some 
case call for curtailing a congressional requirement that individuals participate in 
some other market, two factors make the health insurance market unique.  First, 
health care is distinctive in that almost every individual will, at some point, require 
health care and yet the timing and costs of those needs are unpredictable:  health 
insurance is, as a consequence, the only practicable way in which health care can be 
financed.  And second, existing state and federal laws, which embody a basic and 
permanent commitment of the American people, already require that the costs of 
health care for the uninsured are transferred to other market participants, thus 
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creating an inefficient and inequitable public substitute for private insurance.  The 
MCR merely regulates the unavoidable participation of individuals in this singular 
market in order to make its financing more efficient and eliminate its current 
inequities.  Because this market is unique, Congress infringes no general principle of 
liberty in ordering its activities in a unique way to increase efficiency and eliminate 
inequity.  
II. CONGRESS ALSO HAS POWER UNDER THE NECESSARY AND 
PROPER CLAUSE TO ADOPT THE MINIMUM COVERAGE 
REQUIREMENT AS A MEANS CONGRESS DEEMS APPROPRIATE 
AND CONDUCIVE TO ACCOMPLISH THE ENDS OF THE 
PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT. 
 
The Constitution grants Congress certain enumerated powers, and also 
authority to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution th[os]e foregoing Powers.”  Art. I,  § 8, cl. 9.  Because the MCR is a direct 
regulation of interstate commerce, we think it unnecessary to consider Congress’s 
additional powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Were there any doubt 
that the MCR is a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power, however, the 
provision is a valid means to the full and effective execution of the Act.4 
                                                          
4 The Constitution also grants Congress the “Power To lay and collect Taxes, 
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to … provide for the … general Welfare of the United 
States[.]”  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  This Clause provides an additional 
constitutional basis for the MCR.  In this case, the District Court correctly concluded 
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A. The Necessary And Proper Clause Empowers Congress To 
Choose The Means Best Suited In Its Judgment To Execute Its 
Express Powers, As Long As The Means Are Conducive To A 
Constitutionally Legitimate Legislative End.      
 Since McCulloch v. Maryland, it has been settled law that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause empowers Congress to choose those means that Congress deems 
necessary to the effective exercise of its enumerated powers.  See McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).  As the Supreme Court held in 
McCulloch, the Clause does not limit Congress to choose only those means that are 
necessary in some strictly logical sense, a rule that would render the federal 
government unworkable.  Id. at 415-16, 420-21.  Rather, the Clause permits 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
that the Act fit within Congress’s Commerce Clause power, and so it was 
“unnecessary for the court to address the issue of Congress’s alternate source of 
authority to tax and spend under the General Welfare Clause.”  Op. at 18.  For the 
same reason, amici do not cover this point in detail. 
 
We note, nonetheless, that Congress’s General Welfare Clause power is 
“extensive,” License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 471 (1867), and the MCR fits 
well within this authority.  The Act requires individuals to obtain coverage or pay a 
penalty through the tax system.  ACA § 1501(b).  The tax penalty is codified in the 
Internal Revenue Code; it applies only to taxpayers otherwise required to file 
income tax returns; it is calculated with reference to an individual’s income; it is 
assessed and collected like other tax penalties; and it is enforced by the Internal 
Revenue Service.  Congress expected the provision to raise revenue for the federal 
government.  In part because of the MCR, the Act is projected to reduce the budget 
deficit by $143 billion over ten years.  CBO Letter to Nancy Pelosi (Mar. 20, 2010), 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/AmendReconProp.pdf.   
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Congress to adopt any means “appropriate” to the achievement of any legitimate 
congressional purpose: 
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, 
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that 
end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution, are constitutional. 
 
Id. at 421.  The Court recently reaffirmed the breadth of the Clause in United 
States v. Comstock, where, it recognized that the concern expressed in Lopez 
about “pil[ing] inference on inference” has no place in analyzing a provision 
that is a Necessary and Proper means to executing an enumerated power.  130 
S. Ct. 1949, 1963 (2010) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567).     
B. The Minimum Coverage Requirement Is An Appropriate Means 
Of Executing The Act’s Regulation Of The Interstate Health 
Care Insurance Market, Is Plainly Adapted To The End Of 
Assuring Affordable Health Care For All Americans, And 
Violates No Constitutional Prohibition. 
 The Act’s purpose, to make affordable health insurance available to all 
Americans, is a constitutionally legitimate end.  See South-Eastern Underwriters, 
322 U.S. at 552-53.  As described above, Congress carefully explained why the 
MCR is essential to the Act’s broader goal.  Appellants present no plausible claim 
that the MCR violates any express constitutional prohibition; their suggestion that 
the Necessary and Proper Clause itself imposes such a prohibition is contrary to both 
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principle and precedent.5  Since the MCR is “plainly adapted” to Congress’s 
legitimate regulatory end, the provision is, plainly, valid under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause. 
 This conclusion is bolstered by two additional considerations.  First, the 
Court has maintained ever since McCulloch that Congress may choose any means it 
deems “conducive to the complete accomplishment of [its] object” – that is, 
appropriate to render its legislation completely effective.  See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 
424.  The Necessary and Proper Clause does not invite courts to overturn Congress’s 
choices because litigants may prefer that Congress seek its goals through different 
measures.   
 Second, since McCulloch it has been clear that courts should not substitute 
their views on which means are appropriate for those of the legislature.  In 
McCulloch, the Court explained that even if the constitutional “necessity” of a 
national bank were “less apparent” than the Court believed, “none can deny its being 
an appropriate measure; and if it is, the degree of its necessity, as has been very 
justly observed, is to be discussed in another place” – that is, Congress.  17 U.S. at 
                                                          
5 In Comstock, the Court repeatedly stressed the difference between the 
Necessary and Proper Clause issue and any individual liberty claims in that case.  
130 S. Ct. at 1954, 1956, 1957, 1965.   The Necessary and Proper Clause cannot be 
used to repackage an individual-liberty argument, such as a Fifth Amendment 
economic due process claim, into a claim about Congress’s Article I powers. 
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423.  Modern cases state this principle using the rational basis test: the Clause 
requires that “a federal statute represent a rational means for implementing a 
constitutional grant of legislative authority.”  Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1962.  The 
issue in this case is therefore not whether this Court concludes that the MCR is in 
fact necessary to “the complete accomplishment” of Congress’s goals “but only 
whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 22; see also 
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956.  
 The Constitution authorizes Congress to benefit from experience and to adopt 
new means of executing its enumerated powers.6   See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 415.  
Congress, through the Act, has used its constitutional powers to ensure that all 
Americans have access to quality, affordable health care, while significantly 
reducing long-term health care costs.  Although Appellants may not agree with these 
goals, they are well within Congress’s constitutional bounds. 
                                                          
6 That is the case with the MCR.  Legislation requiring Americans to purchase 
health insurance was first introduced by Republican Senators in 1993.  See Health 
Equity and Access Reform Today Act of 1993, S. 1770, 103rd Cong.  In 2006, a 
Democratic legislature and Republican governor in Massachusetts adopted a health 
reform law with an individual mandate.  And while Congress was formulating the 
Act in 2009, a plan released by former Senate Majority Leaders Howard Baker, Tom 
Daschle, and Bob Dole through the Bipartisan Policy Center also advocated an 
individual mandate. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court below should be affirmed. 
 
      Respectfully submitted, 
 
s/Walter Dellinger 
Professor Walter Dellinger 
1701 18th Street NW 
Washington, DC 20009 
(202) 383-5319 
 
Professor H. Jefferson Powell 
George Washington University Law 
School 
2000 H Street NW  
Washington, DC 20052 
(202) 994-6261 
 
Counsel for Amici Curiae 
Case: 10-2388   Document: 006110850541   Filed: 01/21/2011   Page: 38
    
 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
 In accordance with Rules 32(a)(7)(B) and (C) of the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure and Circuit Rule 32(a), the undersigned certifies that the 
accompanying brief has been prepared using 14-point typeface, proportionally 
spaced, with serifs.  According to the word processing system used to prepare the 
brief, Microsoft Office Word 2003, the brief contains 6,998 words, exclusive of the 
table of contents, table of authorities, attorney identification, and certificates of 
service and compliance. 
 
Dated:  January 21, 2011    
 s/Walter Dellinger 
 
 
Case: 10-2388   Document: 006110850541   Filed: 01/21/2011   Page: 39
    
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I, Walter Dellinger, hereby certify that I caused the foregoing to be 
electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system on January 19, 
2011.  The following participants in the case, who are registered CM/ECF users, will 
be served by the appellate CM/ECF system: 
Counsel for Appellants Counsel for Appellees 
Robert Joseph Muise  
Thomas More Law Center  
P.O. Box 393  
Ann Arbor, MI 48106  
Mark B. Stern  
U.S. Department of Justice  
Civil Division, Appellate Staff  
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20530  
 
David E. Yerushalmi  
Law Offices of David Yerushalmi  
P.O. Box 6358  
Chandler, AZ 85246  
Anisha Dasgupta  
U.S. Department of Justice  
Appellate Section, Tax Division  
7533  
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20530  
 
 Alisa B. Klein  
U.S. Department of Justice  
Civil Division, Appellate Section  
Room 7235  
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20530 
 
 
 s/Walter Dellinger_______ 
Case: 10-2388   Document: 006110850541   Filed: 01/21/2011   Page: 40
